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KŪ KIA‘I MAUNA: PROTECTING INDIGENOUS 
RELIGIOUS RIGHTS 
Joshua Rosenberg* 
Abstract: Courts historically side with private interests at the expense of Indigenous 
religious rights. Continuing this trend, the Hawai‘i State Supreme Court allowed the Thirty-
Meter-Telescope to be built atop Maunakea, a mountain sacred to Native Hawaiians. This 
decision led to a mass protest that was organized by Native Hawaiian rights advocates and 
community members. However, notwithstanding the mountain’s religious and cultural 
significance, Indigenous plaintiffs could not prevent construction of the telescope 
on Maunakea. 
Unlike most First Amendment rights, religious Free Exercise Clause claims are not 
generally subject to strict constitutional scrutiny. Congress has mandated the application of 
strict scrutiny to federal government action that imposes a substantial burden on religious 
activity through the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). However, because most 
courts narrowly interpret “substantial burden,” it has become nearly impossible for Indigenous 
plaintiffs to succeed on claims involving violations of religious freedom. Moreover, RFRA 
does not apply to state governments, and most states—including Hawai‘i—have not enacted 
similar protections for religious rights. 
This Comment suggests that the Hawai‘i State Legislature should enact a state version of 
RFRA that would apply strict scrutiny to government actions that impose a substantial burden 
on religious rights. Further, this Comment urges Congress and state legislatures to enact a more 
expansive definition of “substantial burden” that respects the First Amendment rights of 
Indigenous people to practice their beliefs. 
INTRODUCTION 
Located on the island of Hawai‘i,1 Maunakea2 is one of the most sacred 
locations in Native Hawaiian culture.3 The Native Hawaiian community 
has long opposed private development on the mountain, but until 2018, 
 
* J.D. Candidate, University of Washington School of Law, Class of 2021. I would like to thank 
Professor Eberhard, Professor Gomulkiewicz, and Ms. Violet Pohakuku‘I‘ai Lui-Frank for their 
invaluable time and guidance on this Comment. Also, mahalo nui loa to my family and friends for all 
of their endless support of which I’m eternally grateful for. Lastly, thank you to the WLR editorial 
staff for their incredible insight and feedback. 
1. Commonly referred to as the “Big Island.” 
2. There are generally two acceptable forms of spelling: “Maunakea” and “Mauna Kea.” The 
University of Hawai‘i at Hilo College of Hawaiian Language recommends the former as the proper 
Hawaiian usage. Thus, for the purposes of this article, Maunakea will be used. See Larry Kimura, 
Why Is Maunakea Spelled as One Word?, KA WAI OLA, Nov. 2008, at 17.  
3. See Meghan Miner Murray, Why Are Native Hawaiians Protesting Against a Telescope?, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 22, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/22/us/hawaii-telescope-protest.html 
[http://perma.cc/NP3W-ANLG]. 
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their opposition had never captured the national spotlight.4 Despite its 
religious significance,5 astronomers continue to fight for private 
development of additional observatories on Maunakea’s summit.6 
Astronomers deem Maunakea one of the best sites in the world for 
telescope placement because it stands taller than any other mountain on 
Earth and has a stable climate that is well-suited for 
astronomical observation.7 
In 2018, the Hawai‘i State Supreme Court permitted construction of the 
Thirty-Meter Telescope (TMT) on Maunakea, sparking protests that 
gained national attention.8 Applying a balancing test, the Court ruled that 
construction of the TMT on Maunakea would neither interrupt any Native 
Hawaiian religious practices nor affect the mountain’s natural resources.9 
In response to the decision, the Native Hawaiian community led a 
grassroots movement that delayed the telescope’s construction.10 This 
movement was popularized on social media and garnered national 
recognition through the use of the hashtags #A’oleTMT and 
#weareMaunaKea.11 
 
4. Kanaeokana, Fifty Years of Mismanaging Mauna Kea, VIMEO (Dec. 12, 2017), 
https://vimeo.com/247038723 [http://perma.cc/9CRP-47CW]. 
5. See infra section I.A. 
6. The Facts About TMT on Maunakea, TMT: THIRTY METER TELESCOPE, 
http://www.maunakeaandtmt.org/facts-about-tmt/ [https://perma.cc/VSR5-E7P3]. 
7. See Our Story in Hawaii: Selecting Maunakea, TMT INT’L OBSERVATORY, 
https://www.tmt.org/page/our-story-in-hawaii [http://perma.cc/9W9A-GW2P] (noting that 
Maunakea was selected for TMT because it has some of the best conditions for astronomy such as 
dry and cold climate, and an exceptional atmosphere); see also Highest Mountain in the World, 
GEOLOGY.COM, https://geology.com/records/highest-mountain-in-the-world.shtml 
[http://perma.cc/WAQ5-BRXF] (noting that Mount Everest is the highest, but Maunakea is 
the tallest).  
8. See In re Conservation Dist. Use Application (CDUA) HA-3568, 431 P.3d 752, 757 (Haw. 
2018); Murray, supra note 3. 
9. See In re CDUA HA-3568, 431 P.3d at 768. The balancing test applied requires a balancing of 
cultural, historical, or natural resources in the relevant area; the extent to which those resources—
including traditional and customary Native Hawaiian rights—will be affected or impaired by the 
proposed action; and an assessment of the feasibility of an agency action to reasonably protect Native 
Hawaiian rights if they are found to exist in the area. See infra section II.B. 
10. Laurent Banguet, Giant Telescope Project in Hawaii Delayed by Protests, PHYS.ORG (Sept. 28, 
2019), https://phys.org/news/2019-09-giant-telescope-hawaii-protests.html [http://perma.cc/G8QX-
Q7TW]. 
11. Many celebrities have also demonstrated their support of the cause by either posting on social 
media or visiting Maunakea to stand in solidarity with the protestors, also known as Kia‘i. See Jhené 
Aiko (@jheneaiko), INSTAGRAM (Aug. 18, 2019), https://www.instagram.com/p/B1VRTN6BLMo/ 
(last visited Jan. 19, 2021); Dwayne “The Rock” Johnson (@therock), INSTAGRAM (July 25, 2019), 
https://www.instagram.com/p/B0Xfo3gFqxA (last visited Jan. 19, 2021); Jason Momoa 
(@prideofgypsies), INSTAGRAM (Aug. 12, 2019), https://www.instagram.com/p/B1EMekJARb-/ 
(last visited Jan. 19, 2021); Nicole Scherzinger (@nicolescherzinger), INSTAGRAM (Aug. 22, 2019), 
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To Native Hawaiians, Maunakea has a central role in Hawaiian creation 
stories.12 Maunakea also provides a deep spiritual connection to Native 
Hawaiians’ ancestors, and is the resting place of numerous burial sites.13 
The existing telescopes that were constructed by the University of Hawai‘i 
(UH) in 196814 have polluted Maunakea’s cultural and natural resources 
after fifty years of mismanagement.15 Even Hawai‘i Governor Ige, a 
proponent of TMT, has acknowledged that UH has not met its obligations 
to the mountain and the community.16 The community’s distrust is 
compounded by Hawai‘i’s history of colonization—specifically the 
United States’ illegal annexation of the Hawaiian Islands.17 
Notwithstanding Maunakea’s central importance in Native Hawaiian 
culture, UH’s mismanagement of existing telescopes, and Hawai‘i’s 
history of colonization, the Hawai‘i State Supreme Court still allowed 
TMT’s construction.18 Thus, one can only wonder: what safeguards 
protect Indigenous rights?19 
The First Amendment provides a constitutional right to the free 
exercise of religious beliefs—a right that extends to all people including 
Indigenous people.20 Courts have historically applied strict scrutiny to 
Free Exercise Clause claims under the First Amendment. Under strict 
scrutiny, a law is constitutional only if that law is justified by a compelling 
governmental interest, and is the least restrictive means in furtherance of 
that government interest.21 However, the United States Supreme Court 
decided Employment Division v. Smith22 in 1990, ruling that the state of 
Oregon could deny unemployment benefits to an employee fired for using 
 
https://www.instagram.com/p/B1elXCFhvZx/ (last visited Jan. 19, 2021); Ian Somerhalder 
(@iansomerhalder), INSTAGRAM (July 25, 2019), https://www.instagram.com/p/B0Xb132pQ2Y (last 
visited Jan. 19, 2021). 
12. See infra section I.A. 
13. See infra section I.A. 
14. Kanaeokana, supra note 4. 
15. See id. 
16. See OHA Files Lawsuit Against State for Mismanagement of Mauna Kea, OFF. OF HAWAIIAN 
AFFS. (Nov. 8, 2017), https://www.oha.org/news/oha-files-lawsuit-state-mismanagement-mauna-
kea/ [http://perma.cc/75JA-CQJD]. 
17. See generally NOENOE K. SILVA, ALOHA BETRAYED: NATIVE HAWAIIAN RESISTANCE TO 
AMERICAN COLONIALISM 125–27 (2004). 
18. In re Conservation Dist. Use Application (CDUA) HA-3568, 431 P.3d 752, 782 (Haw. 2018). 
19. “Indigenous” is capitalized throughout this Comment as it is being used as a reference to a 
political community. See Christine Weeber, Why Capitalize “Indigenous”?, SAPIENS (May 19, 2020), 
https://www.sapiens.org/language/capitalize-indigenous [http://perma.cc/SGB5-E3E3]. 
20. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
21. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406–07 
(1963). 
22. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
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peyote—even though the employee used the substance as part of an 
Indigenous tribe’s religious practice.23 The Court considered Oregon’s 
ban on peyote a “valid and neutral law of general applicability” under 
which an individual’s right to the free exercise of religion does not relieve 
their obligation to comply with such a law.24 Moving forward, so long as 
the challenged law is generally applicable, the Court no longer applies 
strict scrutiny to Free Exercise Clause claims except in certain 
situations—further eroding the protections of Indigenous 
religious rights.25 
In response to Smith, Congress sought to provide protection for 
religious liberty and enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
(RFRA) in 1993.26 RFRA statutorily requires courts to apply strict 
scrutiny to religious freedom claims.27 Accordingly, under a RFRA claim, 
if a government action substantially burdens a person’s exercise of 
religion, the government must demonstrate that the burden “(1) is in 
furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least 
restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.”28 
When Congress enacted RFRA, it intended to mandate the application 
of strict scrutiny to federal and state government action that imposes a 
substantial burden on religious exercise.29 However, the Supreme Court 
ruled that RFRA was unconstitutional as applied to the individual states.30 
As a result, state government action that infringes on Indigenous religious 
exercise is not subject to strict scrutiny unless states enact their own 
versions of RFRA. To date, twenty-one states have done so,31 but Hawai‘i 
has not.32 Therefore, Hawai‘i state courts are under no statutory duty to 
apply strict scrutiny to Free Exercise Clause claims challenging laws of 
general applicability. Even though the Native Hawaiian appellants 
asserted RFRA claims in the Maunakea litigation, the Hawai‘i State 
Supreme Court dismissed them because RFRA is inoperable as applied to 
 
23. Id. at 874, 890. 
24. Id. at 879 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982)).  
25. See infra section II.A. 
26. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 694 (2014); Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–2000bb-4. 
27. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–2000bb-4. 
28. Id. § 2000bb-1(b). 
29. Id. §§ 2000bb–2000bb-4. 
30. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 533–36 (1997). 
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the individual states and no Hawai‘i state RFRA exists.33 
Where RFRA does apply, plaintiffs must first establish that the 
government action imposes a substantial burden on their religious 
practices.34 However, the courts have imposed strict limitations on what 
constitutes a substantial burden.35 Federal courts generally find a 
substantial burden in only two situations: where individuals are forced to 
choose between their religion and receiving a governmental benefit, and 
where people are coerced to act contrary to their religious beliefs by threat 
of civil or criminal sanctions.36 Under this doctrine, any burden outside of 
these two narrow criteria is not substantial and does not require a strict 
scrutiny analysis of the government action.37 
Therefore, this Comment calls for the Hawai‘i State Legislature to 
enact a state RFRA and adopt a new definition of “substantial burden” 
that rectifies the denial of Native Hawaiian and Indigenous religious 
rights. Part I provides a brief overview of Hawai‘i’s history and 
Maunakea’s significance to the Native Hawaiian community. This Part 
also documents Maunakea’s existing astronomical usage and the current 
state of the protests against additional development. Part II outlines the 
limited constitutional and statutory protections for Indigenous religious 
exercise, including the First Amendment and RFRA. Moreover, this Part 
analyzes the application of RFRA to Indigenous religious claims in two 
federal cases. Part III examines the Hawai‘i State Supreme Court case that 
allowed TMT’s construction and the Court’s reasoning in rejecting the 
Native Hawaiians’ claims. Part IV proposes two critical changes in the 
law to rectify the concerns over Native Hawaiian rights. First, the Hawai‘i 
State Legislature should enact a Hawai‘i state RFRA. Second, Congress 
and state legislatures should codify a more expansive definition of 
“substantial burden” that will adequately protect Indigenous 
religious beliefs. 
I. HAWAI‘I INDIGENOUS RIGHTS AND THE TMT STAND OFF 
The increasingly popular Hawaiian phrase “Kū Kia‘i Mauna”—
literally translated as “guardians of the mountain”—has echoed across the 
 
33. In re Conservation Dist. Use Application (CDUA) HA-3568, 431 P.3d 752, 771 (Haw. 2018). 
34. Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058, 1069–70 (9th Cir. 2008).  
35. Id. 
36. Id. (combining the holdings in both Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsin v. 
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) to establish a rule determining if a substantial burden exists). 
37. See id. at 1070. 
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nation over the past few years.38 This phrase relates to Maunakea, a 
mountain that Native Hawaiians hold sacred. Notwithstanding 
Maunakea’s cultural significance, telescopes currently occupy 
Maunakea’s summit, which astronomers see as an exceptional site for 
observation. In 2019, protests erupted as Native Hawaiians and advocates 
for Native Hawaiian rights sought to block construction of TMT, a $1.4 
billion project that would place an eighteen-story telescope atop 
Maunakea.39 The protests have delayed construction, but uncertainty 
remains about whether Native Hawaiians will receive long term legal 
protection for Maunakea. 
A. Native Hawaiian Indigenous Rights History and the Significance 
of Maunakea 
The Maunakea protests have a deep history that stems from the Native 
Hawaiian community’s distrust of both the state and federal governments. 
This distrust reaches all the way back to what U.S. President Grover 
Cleveland admitted was the United States’ illegal annexation of the 
Kingdom of Hawai‘i.40 Toward the end of the nineteenth century, Queen 
Lili‘uokalani became the ruler of the Kingdom of Hawai‘i.41 However, a 
group of U.S. politicians and businessmen organized a military coup to 
overthrow Lili‘uokalani.42 In a conspiracy organized by U.S. Minister 
John L. Stevens, American soldiers were sent to the Hawaiian Islands, 
occupied a government building, and declared themselves the Republic of 
Hawai‘i.43 Queen Lili‘uokalani acquiesced to avoid the bloodshed of her 
people, in hopes that the U.S. President would rectify the situation.44 
Although efforts to ratify a treaty of annexation failed in the Senate, the 
 
38. Ryan Collins, A Sign of Solidarity for Mauna Kea, THE GARDEN ISLAND (July 20, 2019, 12:05 
AM), https://www.thegardenisland.com/2019/07/20/hawaii-news/a-sign-of-solidarity-for-mauna-
kea/ [http://perma.cc/6NJQ-77KM]. 
39. Murray, supra note 3; Amy Goodman, “We Are Not Anti-Science”: Why Indigenous Protectors 
Oppose the Thirty Meter Telescope at Mauna Kea, DEMOCRACY NOW! (July 22, 2019), 
https://www.democracynow.org/2019/7/22/why_indigenous_protectors_oppose_the_thirty 
[http://perma.cc/GPS8-8YDH]. 
40. See generally SILVA, supra note 17 (describing the reasons the United States’ annexation of 
Hawai‘i was illegal). 
41. See id. at 129–31. 
42. Id. 
43. Id. For a more in-depth discussion of the illegal annexation of Hawai‘i, specifically the messy 
political intervention of Americans, see id. 
44. Id. at 165; see also Monarchy Overthrown, HAWAIIHISTORY.ORG, 
http://www.hawaiihistory.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=ig.page&PageID=312 [http://perma.cc/V2W3-
BQTB] (explaining that Queen Lili‘uokalani acquiesced after the American businessmen staged 
a coup). 
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United States annexed Hawai‘i under a Congressional joint-resolution in 
1898.45 Native Hawaiians resisted, but “[d]espite the continuous mass 
protest, the flag of the United States was hoisted over Hawai‘i.”46 Scholars 
have explained that the “United States . . . treated the Hawaiian Islands as 
if it were an American colony in order to disguise the illegal nature of its 
occupation of an independent and neutral State.”47 After the annexation, 
the United States acquired approximately 1.5 to 1.8 million acres of 
land—statutorily referred to as the “ceded” lands.48 Maunakea is part of 
these ceded lands that originally belonged to the Kingdom of Hawai‘i.49 
The Territory of Hawai‘i officially became the fiftieth state when the 
United States Congress passed the Hawaii Admission Act in 1959.50 The 
federal government returned the ceded lands to the state with the 
requirement that Hawai‘i “hold these lands in a trust for specific purposes, 
including ‘betterment of the conditions of Native Hawaiians.’”51 The 
Native Hawaiians’ outrage comes from the fact that the United States 
illegally annexed the Hawaiian Kingdom, then returned the ceded lands 
to the Hawai‘i State Government rather than the Native Hawaiian people. 
To Native Hawaiians, this makes the Hawai‘i State officials mere 
 
45. Wynell Schamel & Charles E. Schamel, The 1897 Petition Against the Annexation of Hawaii, 
NAT’L  ARCHIVES,  https://www.archives.gov/education/lessons/hawaii-petition  [http://perma.cc/ 
JR28-S772] (noting that U.S. Senate ratification for treaties requires a two-thirds majority, but joint 
resolutions may be passed by a simple majority in both chambers of Congress). 
46. SILVA, supra note 17, at 161. In order to preserve the interests of the Kingdom of Hawai‘i, 
David Keanu Sai and Donald A. Lewis took deliberate political steps to establish an acting Regent 
under the legal doctrine of necessity. See David Keanu Sai, Establishing an Acting Regency: A 
Countermeasure Necessitated to Protect the Interest of the Hawaiian State 2 (Nov. 28, 2009) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with HawaiianKingdom.org), https://hawaiiankingdom.org/pdf/Ac 
ting_Government.pdf [http://perma.cc/A5TL-RRLB]. This acting regency was established under 
article 33 of the Constitution and laws of the Hawaiian Kingdom and operates “on the legal 
presumption that sovereignty remains vested in the Hawaiian Kingdom since 1843 despite the 
effectiveness of prolonged occupation.” Id. at 4. 
47. Sai, supra note 46, at 4. 
48. See Hawaii Admission Act, Pub. L. No. 86-3, § 5(g), 73 Stat. 4, 6 (1959); Lane Kaiwi 
Opulauoho, Trust Lands for the Native Hawaiian Nation: Lessons from Federal Indian Law 
Precedents, 43 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 75, 75 n.1 (2018) (stating that the ceded lands consist of both 
“crown and government lands that were summarily seized and confiscated when Hawai‘i was annexed 
to the United States in 1898”). 
49. See Zachary Browning, A Comparative Analysis: Legal and Historical Analysis of Protecting 
Indigenous Cultural Rights Involving Land Disputes in Japan, New Zealand, and Hawai‘i, 28 WASH. 
INT’L L.J. 207, 234 (2019). 
50. Hawaii Admission Act. 
51. See Trisha Kehaulani Watson-Sproat, Why Native Hawaiians Are Fighting to Protect 
Maunakea from a Telescope, VOX (July 24, 2019, 12:30 PM), 
https://www.vox.com/identities/2019/7/24/20706930/mauna-kea-hawaii (last visited Feb. 3, 2021) 
(quoting Hawaii Admission Act § 5(f)). 
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“temporary stewards of these crown lands.”52 
Maunakea’s cultural significance in Hawaiian culture is immeasurable. 
Hawaiian traditions of creation dictate that Maunakea was named after 
Wākea,53 the Sky Father, who together with Papahānaumoku, the Earth 
Mother, created the Hawaiian Islands. Maunakea’s summit is known as 
Kūkahau‘ula and is the place where the gods reside.54 The Native 
Hawaiians believe the summit touches the sky, giving them a spiritual 
connection to their ancestors and ensuring the “rights to regenerative 
powers of all that is Hawai‘i.”55 In the pre-colonial years of Hawai‘i, only 
chiefs and priests of the highest status were permitted to visit 
Maunakea’s summit.56 
Lake Waiau is among the most religiously significant sites on 
Maunakea. To this day, Native Hawaiians utilize Lake Waiau’s waters, 
which are associated with the god Kāne, in religious practices.57 
According to members of the Waimea Hawaiian Civic Club, it was a 
common practice for Native Hawaiians to deposit a child’s umbilical cord 
near Lake Waiau, believing that failure to properly dispose the umbilical 
cord would alter the child’s destiny.58 Moreover, Maunakea serves as the 
eternal resting place for those buried across its topography.59 In discussing 
the importance of Maunakea, Alexander Kanani‘alika Lancaster, a Native 
Hawaiian cultural practitioner, has emphasized that his family still travels 
up to the sacred mountain “for ceremonial” purposes to bless the mountain 
 
52. Id. For more information regarding the illegal annexation of Hawai‘i, see SILVA, supra note 17, 
at 160 (“The document also recited the history of the failed annexation treaty, and pointed out that 
‘by memorial the people of Hawaii have protested against the consummation of an invasion of their 
political rights, and have fervently appealed . . . to refrain from further participating in the wrongful 
annexation of Hawaii.’”). 
53. Native Hawaiian traditions identify Maunakea as “Ka Mauna a Wākea,” translating to “The 
Mountain of Wākea.” See Christine Hitt, The Sacred History of Maunakea, HONOLULU MAG. 
(Aug. 5, 2019), http://www.honolulumagazine.com/Honolulu-Magazine/August-2019/The-Sacred-
History-of-Mauna-Kea/ [http://perma.cc/FCV7-QW25].  
54. In re Conservation Dist. Use Application (CDUA) HA-3568, 431 P.3d 752, 757–58 
(Haw. 2018). 
55. Id. 
56. Id. at 758. 
57. See Hitt, supra note 53. 
58. See KEPA MALY & ONAONA MALY, “MAUNA KEA–KA PIKO KAULANA O KA ‘ĀINA”: A 
COLLECTION OF NATIVE TRADITIONS, HISTORICAL ACCOUNTS, AND ORAL HISTORY INTERVIEWS 
FOR: MAUNA KEA, THE LANDS OF KA‘OHE, HUMU‘ULA AND THE ‘ĀINA MAUNA ON THE ISLAND OF 
HAWAI‘I 637 (2005), http://www.malamamaunakea.org/uploads/culture/CulturalDocuments/MalyK
_2005_MaunaKeaOralHistory_HiMK67_OMKM033005b_web.pdf [http://perma.cc/2T2B-CSFL]. 
59. See PATRICK C. MCCOY, SARA COLLINS, STEPHAN D. CLARK & VALERIE PARK, A CULTURAL 
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT PLAN FOR THE UNIVERSITY OF HAWAI‘I MANAGEMENT AREAS ON 
MAUNA KEA KA‘OHE AHUPUA‘A, HĀMĀKUA DISTRICT, ISLAND OF HAWAI‘I 2-24 (2009); In re 
CDUA HA-3568, 431 P.3d at 769. 
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for all of their ancestors buried on Maunakea.60 
Maunakea is considered among the most sacred sites in the Hawaiian 
archipelago. The protests demonstrate this cultural and religious 
importance and the extraordinary measures the Native Hawaiian 
community will take to protect its sacred lands. 
B. Maunakea’s Historic Mismanagement and Its Current Protectors 
Thirteen telescopes currently occupy Maunakea’s summit.61 Their 
mismanagement has led Native Hawaiians to distrust the promises made 
by the TMT International Observatory and the Hawai‘i state government 
to preserve and protect Maunakea’s cultural importance and landscape.62 
The telescope takeover of Maunakea commenced in 1968, when the 
University of Hawai‘i (UH) signed a sixty-five year general lease with the 
Hawai‘i State Board of Land and Natural Resources (BLNR) for 13,321 
acres of ceded lands at Maunakea’s summit.63 UH selected Maunakea 
because it was an “exceptional site for astronomical observation.”64 
Despite the government’s promise to protect Maunakea, significant 
pollution on the mountain led the Sierra Club to file a complaint that 
forced UH to clean up accumulated trash on the summit—at a reported 
cost of $20,000.65 
The extent of this pollution remained unclear until increased public 
concern led the state legislature to order an audit of Maunakea’s 
management.66 In 1998, the state auditor “release[d] a scathing report 
documenting 30 years of mismanagement of [Maunakea] by both the 
BLNR and UH.”67 Subpoenaed documents later revealed that sewage, 
ethylene glycol, diesel fuel, and toxic mercury had polluted Maunakea 
 
60. MCCOY ET AL., supra note 59, at 2-24. 
61. Kanaeokana, supra note 4. 
62. The Facts About TMT on Maunakea, supra note 6. 
63. Kanaeokana, supra note 4. Maunakea is also in a conservation district in which the Department 
of Land and Natural Resources (DLNR) and BLNR are responsible for overseeing and ensuring that 
the use of the land is in compliance with state regulations such as the “allowable uses . . . on 
conservation lands ‘consistent with the conservation . . . of land and natural resources adequate for 
present growth and future needs, and conservation and preservation of open space areas for public 
use and enjoyment.’” See OFF. OF HAWAIIAN AFFS., INTRODUCTION TO HAWAI‘I’S LAND 
CLASSIFICATION AND MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 21 (2015), http://www.oha.org/wp-
content/uploads/HRDC-LUTPManual_PRF6_FINAL.pdf [http://perma.cc/48BJ-YA33]. 
64. N. Jamiyla Chisholm, Watch: The 50-Year History of Mismanagement at Hawai‘i’s Mauna 
Kea, COLORLINES (July 19, 2019, 11:10 AM), https://www.colorlines.com/articles/watch-50-year-
history-mismanagement-hawaiis-mauna-kea [http://perma.cc/UE9N-7GYA]. 
65. Kanaeokana, supra note 4. 
66. Id. 
67. Id. 
Rosenberg (Do Not Delete) 3/22/2021  12:09 PM 
286 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 96:277 
 
and caused substantial harm to Maunakea’s cultural and natural 
resources.68 Further, the construction projects generated significant 
amounts of trash, including “remnants of [old] testing 
equipment . . . [and] two concrete slabs located on one of the [sacred] 
sites.”69 The state auditor continuously pressed UH and the BLNR to 
review and update their leases, subleases, permits, and agreements as they 
“lack[ed] provisions providing for adequate stewardship of [Maunakea], 
such as ones addressing cultural and historical preservation.”70 
Community members attribute this mismanagement to UH’s place among 
academia, favoring astronomy research over everything else.71 While UH 
has taken steps to address these issues,72 the state audit explicitly stated 
that UH’s 1986 Historic Preservation Plan is “over ten years late.”73 
Native Hawaiians argue that the years of mismanagement have already 
demonstrated UH’s “inability to ensure that the environmental and 
cultural significance of the mountain is recognized and protected.”74 
The 1998 state audit found a “lack of recognition for cultural or 
religious sites on Mauna Kea.”75 UH’s astronomy projects force many 
Native Hawaiian cultural practitioners to either forgo their customary and 
traditional religious exercises or accept the impact of the existing 
telescopes and observatories on Native Hawaiian practices.76 Native 
 
68. Id.; Debbie Dickinson, The Issue of TMT on Mauna Kea, with Insights by SU Students, 
SPECTATOR (Oct. 23, 2019), https://seattlespectator.com/2019/10/23/destruction-of-sacred-
mountain-in-hawaii-impacts-su-students/ [https://perma.cc/AMJ8-JD8L]. 
69. THE AUDITOR, STATE OF HAWAI‘I, REP. NO. 98-6, AUDIT OF THE MANAGEMENT OF MAUNA 
KEA AND THE MAUNA KEA SCIENCE RESERVE 24–25 (1998). 




72. In re Conservation Dist. Use Application (CDUA) HA-3568, 431 P.3d 752, 759 (Haw. 2018) 
(discussing UH’s Master Plan that updated its management guidelines to make protecting Maunakea’s 
cultural and natural resources one of its primary goals).  
73. THE AUDITOR, supra note 69, at 22. 
74. Chad Blair, OHA Sues State, UH Over ‘Longstanding Mismanagement’ of Mauna Kea, 
HONOLULU CIV. BEAT (Nov. 8, 2017), https://www.civilbeat.org/2017/11/oha-sues-state-uh-over-
longstanding-mismanagement-of-mauna-kea/ [https://perma.cc/D6QA-KYS4] (quoting OHA 
Trustee Dan Ahuna). In fact, this management has led the Office of Hawaiian Affairs (OHA) to file 
a lawsuit on behalf Native Hawaiian people to hold the state and UH accountable for its “well-
documented mismanagement of Mauna Kea.” See Mauna Kea, OFF. OF HAWAIIAN AFFS., 
https://www.oha.org/maunakea/ [https://perma.cc/YEX4-42KU] (“[T]he state and UH have failed as 
trustees and stewards of this beloved sacred place. Even the governor and the university president 
have both publicly admitted to failing to meet their management responsibilities.”). 
75. THE AUDITOR, supra note 69, at 23. 
76. Id. (noting that Native Hawaiian practitioners had to partake in an onerous process just to have 
access to use the land for religious reasons). 
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Hawaiians are only allowed to practice their religion if they first receive 
permission to access the land from the Institute for Astronomy and submit 
a Conservation District Use Application to the Department of Land and 
Natural Resources to use the land for religious practices.77 
According to TMT proponents, Maunakea was selected for the project 
because of its stable climate and other exceptional conditions.78 
Additionally, Maunakea rises 13,796 feet above sea level and over 33,000 
feet in all, making it the tallest mountain on Earth.79 The TMT 
organization theorizes that this project will result in groundbreaking 
astronomical discoveries, including the observation of other galaxies.80 
The protestors, or Kia‘i,81 defending Maunakea, reject the notion that 
they are anti-science; rather, they state that they are merely “against the 
building of anything 18 stories over [their] watershed, water aquifers, on 
[their] sacred mountain.”82 Their frustration is exacerbated by TMT’s 
selection of Maunakea over La Palma, in the Canary Islands, as the site 
for the project.83 TMT officials have acknowledged that their alternative 
mountain peak in La Palma is a comparable option,84 and there is no 
significant opposition there.85 
While protests against development on Maunakea began as early as 
 
77. Id. 
78. Our Story in Hawaii: Selecting Maunakea, supra note 7. 
79. See Mauna Kea Facts, PROTECT MAUNA KEA, https://www.protectmaunakea.net/mauna-kea-
facts [https://perma.cc/N9DB-WZES] (“Mauna Kea is the tallest—though not the highest—mountain 
on Planet Earth. Rising 13,796 ft above sea level, it is over 33,000 ft tall when measured from its base 
at the bottom of the sea.”); Highest Mountain in the World, supra note 7; (“Mauna Kea is an island, 
and if the distance from the bottom of the nearby Pacific Ocean floor to the peak of the island is 
measured, then Mauna Kea is “taller” than Mount Everest.”). 
80. See TMT Hoping to Add to New Discoveries Made Atop Maunakea, HAW. NEWS NOW, 
https://www.hinowdaily.com/tmt-hoping-to-add-to-new-discoveries-made-atop-maunakea 
[http://perma.cc/WC8C-FCK7]; Chloe Fox, Everything You Need to Know About the Viral Protests 
Against a Hawaii Telescope, HUFFPOST (Dec. 6, 2017), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/hawaii-
telescope-protests-tmt-mauna-kea_n_7044164 [http://perma.cc/F65P-WQUJ]. 
81. Translated on https://www.wehewehe.org, “Kia‘i” means guard, watchman, and caretaker. The 
protestors have given themselves the name Kia‘i and this article will refer to them both as “protestors” 
and “Kia‘i” interchangeably. 
82. Goodman, supra note 39. 
83. Caleb Jones, TMT Backup Site “Excellent,” Comparable to Maunakea, Experts Say, HAW. 




85. Id. But see Jonathan Saupe, Environmentalists in Canary Islands Gear Up for a Fight Against 
TMT, HAW. NEWS NOW (Aug. 7, 2019, 1:20 PM), https://www.hawaiinewsnow.com/2019/08/07/en
vironmentalists-canary-islands-gear-up-fight-against-tmt/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2021) (discussing how 
Ecologistas en Acción has vowed to take legal action to stop TMT from building in the 
Canary Islands). 
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1968 when UH signed the first set of leases, they had subsided until the 
Hawai‘i State Supreme Court upheld the BLNR’s grant of a construction 
permit for TMT.86 The current protests commenced around July 15, 2019, 
when construction of TMT was slated to begin.87 An estimated 10,000 to 
15,000 protestors from all over the State of Hawai‘i and the mainland88 
came to Maunakea to voice their concerns.89 The Kia‘i blocked the only 
access road to the summit, preventing construction of TMT.90 Many 
advocates of Native Hawaiian rights living across the nation organized 
protests within their respective cities.91 This demonstration has evolved 
beyond a mere protest as the Kia‘i have used this opportunity to educate 
others about Native Hawaiian culture.92 Across from the Maunakea access 
road, the Kia‘i have established “Pu‘uhonua o Pu‘uhuluhulu,” an 
academic institution dedicated to educating protestors and visitors about 
Native Hawaiian culture, further preserving Hawaiian culture in a 
continuing effort to protect Indigenous rights from private development.93 
II. THE CLASH BETWEEN INDIGENOUS RIGHTS AND 
DEVELOPMENT 
When balancing Indigenous groups’ religious rights against competing 
private- and public-development interests, courts often favor the latter. In 
Smith, the Supreme Court held that strict scrutiny does not apply to First 
Amendment Free Exercise Clause claims so long as the challenged law is 
valid, neutral, and generally applicable—even if it substantially burdens 
 
86. In re Conservation Dist. Use Application (CDUA) HA-3568, 431 P.3d 752, 757 (Haw. 2018); 
see infra Part II.  
87. Kristin Lam, Why Are Jason Momoa and Other Native Hawaiians Protesting a Telescope on 
Mauna Kea? What’s at Stake?, USA TODAY (Aug. 21, 2019, 8:55 PM), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2019/08/21/mauna-kea-tmt-protests-hawaii-native-
rights-telescope/1993037001/ [http://perma.cc/L5SA-DTA6]. 
88. People from Hawai‘i refer to the continental United States as the “mainland,” although many 
Native Hawaiians refer to it as the “continent,” reflecting their disdain at the U.S. government for the 
illegal annexation of Hawai‘i. 
89. Lam, supra note 87. 
90. See Watson-Sproat, supra note 51. 
91. See, e.g., Thirty Meter Telescope Protests Held in Las Vegas, New York, STAR ADVERTISER 
(July 20, 2019), https://www.staradvertiser.com/2019/07/20/breaking-news/thirty-meter-telescope-
protests-held-in-las-vegas-new-york/ [http://perma.cc/363F-U3TG] (noting that protests of TMT 
construction on Maunakea have been organized in New York, Las Vegas, and other U.S. cities). 
Professors from the UH at Mānoa such as Presley Ah Mook Sang come to Maunakea and teach 
classes. Id.  
92. Lam, supra note 87. 
93. Michael Brestovansky, Makeshift “University” Established at Protestors’ Camp, W. HAW. 
TODAY (July 25, 2019, 12:05 AM), https://www.westhawaiitoday.com/2019/07/25/hawaii-
news/makeshift-university-established-at-protesters-camp/ [http://perma.cc/K8WE-CGBH]. 
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the free exercise of religion.94 Although Congress has mandated the 
application of strict scrutiny by statute through RFRA, the Supreme Court 
held RFRA is inapplicable to the states.95 While some states have passed 
their own version of RFRA, many—including Hawai‘i—have not.96 
Moreover, because the federal courts have narrowly construed 
“substantial burden,” it has become nearly impossible for Indigenous 
plaintiffs to overcome this initial obstacle and succeed on their 
RFRA claims. 
A. Development of Free Exercise Clause Jurisprudence 
Rooted in the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, the Free 
Exercise Clause aims to secure religious liberties for individuals.97 
Therefore, the Constitution provides: “Congress shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof . . . .”98 For Free Exercise Clause claims, there are several strands 
of jurisprudence that dictate whether courts apply a strict scrutiny 
analysis. Strict scrutiny requires the government to show that the 
challenged law is justified by a compelling governmental interest and is 
the least restrictive means in furtherance of that interest.99 The first strand 
is when the challenged law discriminates against or singles out religious 
people or practices.100 With these laws, courts apply strict scrutiny.101 
Next, there are generally applicable laws in which courts will only apply 
strict scrutiny to hybrid claims102 or a denial of religious exemptions if 
 
94. See Emp. Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881 (1990). 
95. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
96. See State Religious Freedom Restoration Acts, supra note 31 (noting that Alabama, Arizona, 
Arkansas, Connecticut, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, 
Missouri, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, 
and Virginia have state versions of RFRA). 
97. Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963). 
98. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
99. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 206 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406–07 
(1963). 
100. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 534 (1993) (“Official 
action that targets religious conduct for distinctive treatment cannot be shielded by mere compliance 
with the requirement of facial neutrality.”). 
101. See id. 
102. Hybrid claims involve the denial of the free exercise of religion in conjunction with another 
constitutionally protected freedom. See, e.g., Emp. Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881 (1990) (“The 
only decisions in which we have held that the First Amendment bars application of a neutral, generally 
applicable law to religiously motivated action have involved not the Free Exercise Clause alone, but 
the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with other constitutional protections . . . .”). 
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other exemptions are provided.103 Lastly, there are cases discussing the 
Free Exercise clause in contexts where the government is operating its 
property in a manner that burdens religious practices.104 Courts generally 
do not apply strict scrutiny to Free Exercise Clause claims in 
this context.105 
Historically, courts applied strict scrutiny to most Free Exercise Clause 
claims.106 In Sherbert v. Verner,107 the plaintiff was a member of the 
Seventh-Day Adventist Church and was fired for refusing to work on 
Saturdays, the Sabbath Day of her faith.108 Unable to obtain other 
employment for this same reason, the plaintiff filed a claim for 
unemployment compensation benefits under the South Carolina 
Unemployment Compensation Act.109 However, the Employment 
Security Commission noted that, under the state statute, “good cause” is 
needed to reject suitable work when it is offered.110 The Commission ruled 
that the plaintiff’s inability to work on Saturdays was not “good cause” 
and disqualified her from receiving unemployment benefits.111 
The plaintiff then brought a claim under the Free Exercise Clause of 
the First Amendment alleging that the South Carolina statute abridged her 
right to the free exercise of religion.112 The Supreme Court stated that the 
 
103. See, e.g., Smith, 494 U.S. at 882–84 (noting that strict scrutiny applies when a State has an 
individual exemptions system and refuses to extend those exemptions to cases of “religious 
hardship”). Generally applicable laws are those that do not single out or target specific groups. See, 
e.g., Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 592 U.S. __, 141 S. Ct. 63, 66 (2020) (ruling that 
the regulation was not neutral nor generally applicable because it “single[d] out houses of worship for 
especially harsh treatment”). Other courts have seen Roman Catholic Diocese as a seismic shift in 
Free Exercise law as it held that disparate treatment of religion rendered COVID-19 restrictions not 
neutral or generally applicable. See Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley v. Sisolak, No. 20-16169, 2020 
WL 7350247, at *3 (9th Cir. Dec. 15, 2020). 
104. See, e.g., Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 442 (1988) (involving 
a dispute between the U.S. Forest Service and American Indian tribes over a proposal to construct a 
paved road through federal land that has historically been used by various tribes for 
religious activities). 
105. See id. (declining to apply Sherbert’s compelling interest test where the challenged action was 
the government’s construction of a road). 
106. See, e.g., Thomas v. Rev. Bd. of Ind. Emp. Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981) (applying 
strict scrutiny to an Indiana Employment Security Review Board denial of a claim for unemployment 
compensation where the claimant was terminated because his religious beliefs interfered with his 
work); Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 480 U.S. 136, 141 (1987) (applying strict 
scrutiny to a plaintiff’s claim where the plaintiff was denied unemployment compensation benefits 
after being fired for refusing to work on her Sabbath). 
107. 347 U.S. 398 (1963). 
108. Id. at 399. 
109. Id. at 399–400. 
110. Id. at 401. 
111. Id. 
112. Id. 
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statute is constitutional if “any incidental burden on the free exercise of 
[plaintiff’s] religion may be justified by a ‘compelling state interest.’”113 
To justify the burden imposed on the plaintiff, the state asserted that the 
infringement was necessary to prevent “the filing of fraudulent claims by 
unscrupulous claimants feigning religious objections to Saturday work” 
that would “dilute the unemployment compensation fund” and “hinder the 
scheduling by employers of necessary Saturday work.”114 The Court 
disagreed and did not find this government interest compelling enough to 
justify the substantial burden imposed on the plaintiff.115 
Sherbert’s broad application of strict scrutiny to Free Exercise Clause 
claims began to narrow in Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective 
Association.116 In this case, the Court discussed the application of 
Sherbert’s compelling interest test in a dispute involving Indigenous 
rights and government action. Lyng involved Indian tribes challenging the 
U.S. Forest Service’s approval of plans to construct a logging road in the 
Chimney Rock area of the Six Rivers National Forest in California.117 The 
Indigenous groups argued that the construction would disturb the sacred 
area, interfering with the tribes’ free exercise of religion and causing 
irreparable damage.118 The Court disagreed, explaining that 
accommodating all religious rights would not allow the government to 
operate: 
Even if we assume that we should accept the Ninth Circuit’s 
prediction, according to which the G-O road will “virtually 
destroy the . . . Indian’s ability to practice their religion,” the 
Constitution simply does not provide a principle that could justify 
upholding [the tribes’] legal claims. However much we might 
wish that it were otherwise, government simply could not operate 
if it were required to satisfy every citizen’s religious needs and 
desires. 
. . . . 
. . . Whatever rights the Indians may have to the use of the area, 
however, those rights do not divest the Government of its right to 
use what is, after all, its land.119 
The Indigenous groups also asserted that, in accordance with Sherbert, 
 
113. Id. at 403. 
114. Id. at 407. 
115. Id. 
116. 485 U.S. 439 (1988). 
117. See id. 
118. Id. at 443–44. 
119. See id. at 451–53 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted). 
Rosenberg (Do Not Delete) 3/22/2021  12:09 PM 
292 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 96:277 
 
the government must demonstrate a compelling interest in completing the 
road.120 However, the Court disagreed, finding that no such interest was 
necessary because the “incidental effects of government programs . . . [do 
not] require [the] government to bring forward a compelling justification 
for its otherwise lawful actions.”121 The Court essentially held the 
Sherbert compelling interest test inapplicable and justified that holding 
based on the government’s inability to function if forced to account for 
every tribes’ religious exercises.122 Lyng applies the Free Exercise Clause 
in a different context—the government conducting its own internal affairs 
rather than passing laws that infringe on religious rights—which may 
indicate that RFRA only applies to challenges against laws. However, 
courts have applied RFRA in cases involving challenges to statutes and 
government actions in the same context as Lyng.123 
Lyng was, in part, a precursor to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Smith—
a decision that severely limited the Free Exercise Clause’s religious 
protections.124 In Smith, two Native American plaintiffs were fired for 
ingesting peyote for sacramental purposes during a religious ceremony.125 
Both applied for unemployment benefits but were denied because of their 
discharge for work-related misconduct.126 The Employment Division 
argued that denial of unemployment benefits was permissible because 
Oregon law criminalized the ingestion of peyote.127 
The plaintiffs argued that Sherbert required states to demonstrate a 
compelling interest that justified governmental actions that substantially 
burdened an individual’s religious practices.128 Rather than following its 
own precedent, the Court departed from it and severely limited the 
compelling interest test to the facts of Sherbert.129 The Court noted that 
the Sherbert test was developed in the context of unemployment 
compensation eligibility rules.130 Thus, it is inapplicable to an across-the-
 
120. See id. at 447. 
121. See id. at 450–51. 
122. See also Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 699 (1986) (“Never to our knowledge has the Court 
interpreted the First Amendment to require the Government itself to behave in ways that the individual 
believes will further his or her spiritual development or that of his or her family. The Free Exercise 
Clause simply cannot be understood to require the Government to conduct its own internal affairs in 
ways that comport with the religious beliefs of particular citizens.” (emphasis in original)). 
123. See infra section II.C. 
124. See Emp. Div. v.  Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878 (1990).  
125. Id. at 874. 
126. Id. 
127. Id. at 875. 
128. Id. at 883. 
129. Id. at 888–89. 
130. See id. at 882–85. 
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board criminal prohibition on particular conduct.131 The Smith Court’s 
holding stands for the proposition that the right of free exercise of religion 
does not warrant strict scrutiny as long as the law curtailing religious 
freedom is one of general applicability.132 Accordingly, the Court held that 
the denial of unemployment compensation benefits did not violate the 
plaintiffs’ religious rights because the Oregon law was a general criminal 
prohibition on the use of peyote.133 This case completely changed First 
Amendment jurisprudence because “[t]he Court found strict scrutiny 
inapposite, despite the longstanding tradition of applying this heightened 
scrutiny standard to fundamental interests, and hesitated to deem 
infringements on the exercise of religion presumptively invalid.”134 
Today, under Free Exercise Clause claims, neutral laws of general 
applicability are not subject to strict scrutiny besides the aforementioned 
exemptions. Scholars have called Smith “a transformative moment in First 
Amendment law.”135 With the widespread criticism of Smith and the 
widespread Congressional and public support of RFRA, Congress was 
primed to pass additional religious statutory protections.136 
B. Legislative History and Passage of RFRA 
In response to Smith, Congress passed RFRA in an attempt to restore 
Sherbert’s broad application of strict scrutiny.137 Under RFRA, the 
“[g]overnment shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of 
religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability.”138 
Congress’s stark disapproval of the Supreme Court’s decision in Smith is 
evident in RFRA’s language where it explicitly references Smith’s general 
 
131. See id. 
132. See id. at 879; see also Sara Movahed, Hope for the Hopi in a Post-Hobby Lobby World: The 
Supreme Court’s Recent Interpretation of RFRA and Strengthening Native Americans’ Religious-
Based Land Rights Claims, 31 MD. J. INT’L L. 244, 247 (2016). 
133. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 890. 
134. Movahed, supra note 132, at 247.  
135. Kristen A. Carpenter, Limiting Principles and Empowering Practices in American Indian 
Religious Freedoms, 45 CONN. L. REV. 387, 389 (2012).  
136. See Robert F. Drinan & Jennifer I. Huffman, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: A 
Legislative History, 10 J.L. & RELIGION 531, 534 (1993). 
137. COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 14.03 (2020); see also United States v. 
Tawahongva, 456 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1130 (D. Ariz. 2006) (recognizing that “RFRA is not interpreted 
by the federal courts as a ‘separate’ statutory defense to a criminal charge, but as an instruction to the 
courts to replace the Smith standard for evaluating First Amendment free exercise claims with the 
‘compelling interest’ test”); Meyer v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 929 F. Supp. 10, 14 (D.D.C. 1996) 
(stating that the “purpose of the RFRA was merely [to] ‘restore the compelling interest test’” that was 
applicable pre-Smith (quoting S. REP. NO. 103-111 (1993)). 
138. Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–1(a) (emphasis added). 
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applicability rule. Many religious groups supported this passage, but 
“[l]ost in this conversation . . . have been the American Indians who 
actually lost the right to practice their religion in Smith.”139 One scholar 
speculated that it was “the Court’s inability to discern a limit on the Indian 
religious practices” that led to the outright denial of such claims.140 
Although Congress’s purpose for passing RFRA was to protect the free 
exercise of religion, courts severely limited RFRA’s effectiveness.141 A 
significant limiting principle was established in City of Boerne v. 
Flores.142 In Boerne, the Court found RFRA unconstitutional as applied 
to the states because it exceeded Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment 
enforcement powers.143 Therefore, for most state actions, plaintiffs’ 
primary legal recourse for religious rights violations is limited to a claim 
under the Free Exercise Clause where Smith’s rule of general applicability 
remains the law. In contrast, when plaintiffs assert federal violations of 
the free exercise of religion, courts apply strict scrutiny to their RFRA 
claims, but Smith’s holding to their Free Exercise Clause claims. While 
unable to constitutionally overrule the decision in Smith, Congress 
effectively mandated—through RFRA—the application of strict scrutiny 
analysis to federal laws substantially burdening an individual’s free 
exercise of religion. Accordingly, RFRA and the Free Exercise Clause are 
conceptually distinct; they are two potential legal protections with two 
completely different standards for plaintiffs suffering a substantial burden 
on their freedom of religion. 
Although some states have their own version of RFRA, Hawai‘i does 
not. In 2017, the Hawai‘i State Legislature considered House Bill 823,144 
a bill that would have provided RFRA-like protections, “to ensure that 
strict scrutiny [would be] applied in all cases where state action burdens 
the exercise of religion.”145 Similar to RFRA, this bill would only allow 
the government to impose a burden on religious practices if the burden 
was essential to further a compelling governmental interest and was the 
 
139. Carpenter, supra note 135, at 390. 
140. Id. at 392. Carpenter argues that minority religions have much more difficulty in succeeding 
under a RFRA claim. See id. at 392–93. She attributes this difficulty to the fact that judges rely on 
their common sense and experiences in religious cases. Id. Consequently, judges find it difficult to 
evaluate the legitimacy and scope of particular minority, religious practices (i.e., Native Hawaiian 
and Native American religious practices) and instead, “prefer bright line rules over nuanced analysis.” 
Id. at 393. 
141. See infra Part IV. 
142. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
143. See id. 
144. H.R. 823, 29th Leg. (Haw. 2017). 
145. Id. (emphasis added). 
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least restrictive means of furthering that interest.146 However, it failed to 
pass.147 It is unclear why the bill failed, but in general, major challenges 
with passing state RFRAs include worries of increased litigation and 
conflict between religious liberty and civil rights.148 More specifically, 
civil rights advocates have raised concerns that a state RFRA may allow 
individuals or corporations to discriminate against others on the grounds 
of “race, gender, age, nationality, or sexual orientation,” which would 
inhibit enforcement of state civil rights laws.149 
C. Application of RFRA to Indigenous Rights 
Even with federal government action, where RFRA applies, Indigenous 
plaintiffs face substantial obstacles to their Free Exercise Clause claims. 
Federal courts have developed a two-part test to determine whether 
religious rights are protected under RFRA: first, there must be evidence 
sufficient for a trier of fact to find the activity the Indigenous group claims 
is burdened by government action is an exercise of religion;150 and second, 
“the government action must ‘substantially burden’ the plaintiff’s 
exercise of religion.”151 This substantial burden requirement has proven 
fatal to many Indigenous groups’ RFRA claims because federal courts 
have limited its applicability to two strict situations. 
First, an individual incurs a substantial burden when they “are forced 
to choose between following the tenets of their religion and receiving a 
governmental benefit.”152 The Court developed this part of the test in 
Sherbert when it held that the South Carolina statute unconstitutionally 
forced the plaintiff “to choose between following the precepts of her 
religion and forfeiting benefits . . . and abandoning one of the precepts of 
 
146. Id. 
147. Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), REWIRE NEWS GRP., 
https://rewire.news/legislative-tracker/law-topic/religious-freedom-restoration-act/ 
[http://perma.cc/X6QR-G3YN]. 
148. See Robert M. O’Neil, Religious Freedom and Nondiscrimination: State RFRA Laws Versus 
Civil Rights, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 785, 792 (1999) (discussing the conflict between RFRA and state 
civil rights laws); see also Elizabeth Long, Note, A Case for Kentucky’s State RFRA in Its Current 
Form, 43 N. KY. L. REV. 251, 252 (2016) (acknowledging that in light of the decision in Obergefell 
v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015), state RFRAs have been labeled as “‘a license to discriminate’ against 
the LGBT community” (citation omitted)); Alan Reinach, Why We Need State RFRA Bills: A Panel 
Discussion, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 823, 825 (1999) (explaining that senators in the Arizona State 
Senate argued that a state RFRA would open the door to a drastic increase in litigation if the bill 
were adopted). 
149. See O’Neil, supra note 148, at 792; Long, supra note 148, at 252. 
150. See Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058, 1068 (9th Cir. 2008).  
151. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a)). 
152. Id. at 1070. 
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her religion in order to accept work.”153 
Second, an individual who is “coerced to act contrary to their religious 
beliefs by the threat of civil or criminal sanctions” suffers a substantial 
burden.154 The Court developed this part of the substantial burden 
requirement in Wisconsin v. Yoder,155 where members of the Amish 
religion refused to have their kids attend school in violation of a 
Wisconsin statute that imposed criminal sanctions on the parents.156 The 
Yoder Court held that the statute imposed a substantial burden and was 
unconstitutional because it “affirmatively compel[led the defendants], 
under threat of criminal sanction, to perform acts undeniably at odds with 
fundamental tenets of their religious beliefs.”157 
Federal courts have combined the holdings of Sherbert and Yoder to 
formulate the substantial burden requirement under RFRA: a substantial 
burden is imposed only when individuals are either “forced to choose 
between following the tenets of their religion and receiving a 
governmental benefit” or “coerced to act contrary to their religious beliefs 
by the threat of civil or criminal sanctions.”158 Courts only apply strict 
scrutiny and shift the burden to the government if the plaintiff can first 
establish a substantial burden on their free exercise of religion.159 Two 
cases demonstrate the difficulty Indigenous groups face when trying to 
provide sufficient evidence to establish a substantial burden on their 
religious rights: Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. United States Army Corps 
of Engineers160 and Navajo Nation v. United States Forest Service.161 
1. Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. United States Army Corp of 
Engineers 
In Standing Rock, several American Indian tribes challenged 
construction of the Dakota Access Pipeline (DAPL).162 When the suit was 
initiated, DAPL was nearly complete, except for a stretch that was to run 
under the bed of Lake Oahe, a federally regulated waterway bordering 
 
153. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963). 
154. Navajo Nation, 535 F.3d at 1070. 
155. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
156. Id. at 207–08. 
157. Id. at 218. 
158. Navajo Nation, 535 F.3d at 1069–70. 
159. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 206; Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406–07 (1963). 
160. 239 F. Supp. 3d 77 (D.D.C. 2017). 
161. 535 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2008). 
162. Standing Rock, 239 F. Supp. 3d at 80. 
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North and South Dakota.163 Lake Oahe is located about half a mile north 
of the Standing Rock Reservation and seventy-three miles north of the 
Cheyenne River Reservation.164 
Four separate groups of Lakota people within the Cheyenne River 
Reservation use Lake Oahe to perform water-based religious 
ceremonies.165 These rituals require the water to be pure, and tribes 
contend that the mere presence of oil in DAPL flowing underneath Lake 
Oahe contaminates the lake’s water and interferes with their religious 
practices.166 Further, the tribes believe the crude oil that would flow 
through DAPL is the “fulfillment of a Lakota prophecy of a Black Snake 
that would be coiled in the Tribe’s homeland and which would harm” or 
kill them.167 The tribes also argued that Lake Oahe is incredibly important 
to their existence because the U.S. removed their access to other bodies 
of water that are important in their culture.168 
Despite the importance of Lake Oahe to the tribes, the court denied the 
Standing Rock and Cheyenne River Sioux Tribes’ motion for preliminary 
injunction to block the government from permitting DAPL to run under 
Lake Oahe.169 One of the tribes’ main contentions was that the 
government approval of DAPL violated RFRA.170 The court 
acknowledged that the Lakota people have a sincerely held belief that the 
presence of oil in DAPL running under Lake Oahe interferes with its 
members’ religious ceremonies.171 Nevertheless, it concluded DAPL was 
not a substantial burden on their religious rights because the government 
action did not impose any sanction on the tribes’ members for exercising 
their religious beliefs, nor did it pressure them to choose between a 
government benefit or practicing their religion.172 This case emphasizes 
the onerous nature of the substantial burden requirement that is 





165. Id. at 89. 
166. Id. 
167. Id. at 90. 
168. Id. at 89. 
169. Id. at 100. 
170. See id. at 91. 
171. See id. 
172. See id. (“The government action here . . . does not impose a sanction on the Tribe’s members 
for exercising their religious beliefs, nor does it pressure them to choose between religious exercise 
and the receipt of government benefits.”). 
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2. Navajo Nation v. United States Forest Service 
In Navajo Nation, American Indian tribes brought a suit to prohibit the 
federal government from allowing the Snowbowl ski resort to use 
recycled wastewater for artificial snow on the San Francisco Peaks (the 
Peaks).173 The tribes argued that the use of recycled wastewater would 
“spiritually contaminate the entire mountain and devalue their religious 
exercises.”174 The Peaks serve as the location for various religious 
ceremonies, including the Navajo Blessingway Ceremony.175 Further, the 
Peaks contain many resources for the tribes such as plants, water, and 
other materials that are used for medicinal bundles and tribal healing 
ceremonies.176 From the tribes’ perspective, using artificial snow on this 
sacred mountain would interfere with their religious ceremonies and 
desecrate the entire mountain.177 
However, like the Standing Rock court held nine years later, the Navajo 
Nation court reasoned that the presence of wastewater on the Peaks did 
not coerce the tribes to act contrary to their religious beliefs under threat 
of sanctions, nor did it condition a governmental benefit upon conduct that 
would violate their religious beliefs.178 The court found that the use of 
artificial snow would not impose a substantial burden on the tribes’ 
exercise of religion, stating that “[t]he only effect of the proposed [project] 
is on the [tribes’] subjective, emotional religious experience.”179 As 
discussed below, the majority opinion presented similar reasoning to that 
of the Hawai‘i Supreme Court’s decision in the Maunakea case.180 Even 
though the entirety of Maunakea is sacred to Native Hawaiians and the 
entirety of the Peaks is sacred to the Navajo Nation, both courts justified 
their holdings on the basis that the proposed government action would 
 
173. Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058, 1062–63 (9th Cir. 2008). This is not the 
first time these tribes have challenged government action on the Peaks with regards to Snowbowl. 
Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir. 1983). In Wilson v. Block, the American Indian tribes 
challenged a number of proposed upgrades to the operations of Snowbowl including the installation 
of new lifts, slopes, and facilities. 708 F.2d 735, 739 (D.C. Cir. 1983). Despite arguments that the 
proposals would significantly damage the tribes’ ability to pray and engage in other religious 
exercises, the court rejected the challenge. Id. at 741–42 (“Many government actions may offend 
religious believers, and may cast doubt upon the veracity of religious beliefs, but unless such actions 
penalize faith, they do not burden religion.”). 
174. Navajo Nation, 535 F.3d at 1063. 
175. Id. at 1064. 
176. Id. 
177. Id. 1062–63. 
178. Id. at 1070 (“[T]he diminishment of spiritual fulfillment–serious though it may be–is not a 
‘substantial burden’ on the free exercise of religion.”). 
179. Id. 
180. See infra Part III. 
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only affect a small part of the mountains.181 Notably, neither court 
considered an argument that damage to even minor areas could impact the 
religious practices of these Indigenous groups.182 
In the Navajo dissenting opinion, Judge Fletcher contended that the 
majority’s interpretation of substantial burden was extremely 
restrictive.183 He further argued that the majority’s interpretation erred 
because RFRA does not incorporate any pre-RFRA definition of 
substantial burden, attacking the synergy of the rules in Sherbert and 
Yoder.184 Moreover, the purpose of RFRA was to expand religious 
protection, not contract it.185 Judge Fletcher’s dissent suggested adopting 
the “plain and ordinary meaning [of substantial burden] that does not 
depend on the presence of a penalty or deprivation of benefit.”186 
The federal court system has set the tone for the individual states, 
making it increasingly difficult to ensure adequate protection for 
Indigenous groups’ religious and cultural rights. Post-Smith, Congress 
immediately passed RFRA to provide greater protection for religious 
rights. However, federal courts have severely limited RFRA’s 
application—contrary to Congress’s intent. Such a critical issue demands 
further attention from both Congress and state legislatures. 
III. HAWAI‘I STATE SUPREME COURT DECISION: 
APPROVING TMT CONSTRUCTION 
As federal courts have severely limited RFRA protections, so too have 
many states. The Hawai‘i State Supreme Court’s decision exemplifies just 
how difficult it remains for Indigenous groups to receive religious 
protections at the state level. The nationally recognized Maunakea 
protests were sparked by the Hawai‘i Supreme Court’s 2018 decision in 
the In re Conservation District Use Application HA-3568.187 This case 
upheld a decision by the BLNR that approved the permit for TMT’s 
 
181. See In re Conservation Dist. Use Application (CDUA) HA-3568, 431 P.3d 752, 770 (Haw. 
2018) (reasoning that TMT would not affect Native Hawaiian religious practices because it was not 
within the relative area of Native Hawaiian cultural sites); Navajo Nation, 535 F.3d at 1070 (noting 
that the use of recycled wastewater will only affect 1% of the Peaks). The Hawai‘i State Supreme 
Court did not conduct a RFRA analysis because of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in 
City of Boerne v. Flores. See In re CDUA HA-3568, 431 P.3d at 771. They did, however, use similar 
reasoning to the Navajo Nation court in denying the Native Hawaiian’s claims. Id. at 770. 
182. See generally Navajo Nation, 535 F.3d 1058; In re CDUA HA-3568, 431 P.3d 752. 
183. Navajo Nation, 535 F.3d at 1086 (Fletcher, J., dissenting). 
184. See id. 
185. See id. 
186. Id. 
187. 431 P.3d 752 (Haw. 2018). 
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construction.188 The Hawai‘i Supreme Court’s decision reflects the 
national trend of favoring competing development interests over the 
religious rights of Indigenous groups. 
Caltech and the University of California formed the original TMT 
corporation in 2003 with the intention of “fostering astronomy through 
building a thirty meter telescope”189 and submitted a conservation land use 
permit for the TMT proposal in 2010.190 Despite failing to hold a contested 
case hearing, the BLNR granted the permit on April 12, 2013.191 TMT 
International Observatory, LLC (TIO) was later created as a nonprofit 
organization in May of 2014 and succeeded the original TMT corporation 
as owner of the project.192 However, in 2015, the Hawai‘i Supreme Court 
unanimously vacated the permit and held that the BLNR’s approval of the 
permit before conducting a contested case hearing violated the due 
process rights of parties with standing to assert Native Hawaiian rights.193 
Notably, the Court held that state agencies must act consistently with their 
affirmative obligations under the Hawai‘i Constitution.194 
After the permit was vacated, the BLNR held a contested case hearing 
and submitted its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and decision to 
grant the conservation permit to TIO.195 Native Hawaiian cultural 
 
188. Id. at 782. 
189. Id. at 759.  
190. See id. at 760. Maunakea is part of the two million acres of conservation lands around the 
Hawaiian Islands protected in Hawai‘i’s conservation district. See Sacred Summits: Legal 
Protections, KAHEA, http://kahea.org/issues/sacred-summits/legal-protections [http://perma.cc/5CP 
V-FS56]. The purpose of these conservation district designations is to “conserve, protect, and preserve 
the important natural resources of [Hawai‘i] through appropriate management and use to promote 
their long-term sustainability and the public health, safety and welfare.” HAW. REV. STAT. § 183C-1 
(2020). Commercial use of lands within conservation districts require a Conservation District Use 
Permit (CDUP), which must be approved by the State Board of Land and Natural Resources (BLNR). 
See KAHEA, supra. 
191. In re CDUA HA-3568, 431 P.3d at 760. 
192. See id. at 759. TMT International Observatory is “comprised of the Regents of the University 
of California, Caltech, the National Institutes of Natural Sciences of Japan, the National Astronomical 
Observatories of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, the Department of Science and Technology of 
India, and the National Research Council of Canada.” Id. 
193. Mauna Kea Anaina Hou v. Bd. of Land & Nat. Res., 363 P.3d 224, 238–39 (Haw. 2015).  
194. See In re CDUA HA-3568, 431 P.3d at 760 (citing Mauna Kea Anaina Hou, 363 P.3d at 262). 
In Ka Pa‘akai O Ka‘Aina v. Land Use Commission, the Hawai‘i State Supreme Court held that 
article XII, section 7 of the Hawai‘i Constitution places “an affirmative duty on the State and its 
agencies to preserve and protect traditional and customary native Hawaiian rights.” 7 P.3d 1068, 1082 
(Haw. 2000). The core of this affirmative duty is the responsibility of the State and its agencies to act 
only after “independently considering the effect of their actions on Hawaiian traditions and practices.” 
Id. at 1083. 
195. See In re CDUA HA-3568, 431 P.3d at 760. 
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practitioners appealed directly to the Hawai‘i State Supreme Court.196 
On appeal, the Hawai‘i State Supreme Court considered several issues 
related to TMT’s construction, including whether TMT infringed on the 
religious rights of Native Hawaiians and whether TMT violated 
constitutional public trust and land use requirements.197 
A. Native Hawaiian Rights Issues 
The Court first considered whether the BLNR acted in accordance with 
the Hawai‘i Constitution to protect Native Hawaiian rights. Article XII, 
section 7 of the Hawai‘i Constitution provides that the state government 
must protect “all rights, customarily and traditionally exercised 
for . . . cultural and religious purposes” that Native Hawaiians possess.198 
At the outset, the Court reiterated the State’s obligation to protect the 
reasonable exercise of customary and traditional Hawaiian rights, to the 
extent feasible.199 In order to effectuate article XII, section 7, the Court 
applied the balancing test between Native Hawaiian rights and competing 
private interests that was articulated in Ka Pa‘akai OKa‘Āina v. Land Use 
Commission.200 This test requires an administrative agency to, at a 
minimum, make three specific findings of fact and conclusions of law.201 
First, an agency must determine the “identity and scope of ‘valued 
cultural, historical, or natural resources’ in the [relevant] area, including 
the extent to which traditional and customary [N]ative Hawaiian rights are 
exercised in the . . . area.”202 Second, the agency must find “the extent to 
which those resources—including traditional and customary [N]ative 
Hawaiian rights—will be affected or impaired by the proposed action.”203 
Finally, the agency must assess the feasibility of further agency action to 
reasonably protect Native Hawaiian rights if they are found to exist in 
 
196. The appeal was made pursuant to a Hawai‘i statute that allows direct appeals for final 
decisions in contested cases regarding conservation districts. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 183C-9 (2020). 
197. See In re CDUA HA-3568, 431 P.3d at 761. The Hawai‘i State Supreme Court also considered 
a number of disqualification issues (such as whether potential prejudice towards Native Hawaiians 
and the hearing officer having family ties to astronomy centers tainted the contested hearing), public 
trust and land use issues, and procedural issues. See id. However, these issues are beyond the scope 
of this Comment. 
198. HAW. CONST. art. XII, § 7. 
199. See In re CDUA HA-3568, 431 P.3d at 768; see also Pub. Access Shoreline Haw. v. Haw. 
Cnty. Plan. Comm’n, 903 P.2d 1246, 1271 n.43 (Haw. 1995) (reaffirming the State’s obligation to 
protect Native Hawaiian rights “to the extent feasible”). 
200. 7 P.3d 1068, 1072 (Haw. 2000); In re CDUA HA-3568, 431 P.3d at 768–69. 
201. Ka Pa‘akai O Ka‘Āina, 7 P.3d at 1084. 
202. Id. (footnote omitted). 
203. Id. 
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the area.204 
The Hawai‘i State Supreme Court ultimately found that the BLNR 
satisfied the Kapa‘akai test, fulfilling its obligations under the Hawai‘i 
Constitution.205 Regarding the first requirement, the Court agreed with the 
BLNR’s conclusion that there was no evidence of Native Hawaiian 
cultural resources or religious exercise at the proposed observatory site or 
the access road.206 The Court determined that a majority of the Native 
Hawaiian cultural practitioners conduct their practices in other areas of 
Maunakea’s summit, such as Lake Waiau, Pu‘u Līlīnoe, or 
Kūkahau‘ula.207 The TMT Observatory site is located 600 feet below the 
summit and because of this, the Court found that the TMT would not 
interfere with Native Hawaiian religious practices.208 
For the second requirement, the Court found that the TMT project 
would not impair or affect the area’s cultural, historical, and natural 
resources.209 According to the Court, the resources would not be affected 
because “the TMT Observatory will not be visible from . . . culturally 
sensitive areas of the summit of [Maunakea].”210 Further, the Court noted 
that spiritual practices have been occurring for nearly two decades while 
astronomy facilities have existed.211 However, this ignored the argument 
that Native Hawaiian cultural practitioners were either forced to forgo 
their customary and traditional exercises or accept the existing telescopes 
and continue their practices.212 It also disregarded the fact that the Native 
Hawaiians believe the entire mountain is sacred; therefore, the mere 
presence of these observatories and astronomy facilities is abhorrent to 
sacred tradition.213 
Lastly, because the Court did not find that Native Hawaiian rights were 
exercised in the TMT Observatory site area, the BLNR was not required 
to discuss measures to ensure the protection of Native Hawaiian rights and 
 
204. Id. 
205. In re CDUA HA-3568, 431 P.3d at 771. 
206. Id. at 769. 
207. Id. at 769–70. 
208. Id. at 770. 
209. See id. 
210. Id. 
211. Id. 
212. See supra section I.B. 
213. See, e.g., NATIVE HAWAIIAN LAW: A TREATISE 3 (Melody Kapilialoha MacKenzie et al. eds., 
2015) (“Kānaka Maoli trace their ancestry to the ‘āina (land), to the natural forces of the 
world . . . . All are related in a deep and profound way that infuses Hawaiian thought and is expressed 
in all facets of Hawaiian life.”). 
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practices under the third factor.214 Accordingly, the Court concluded that 
the BLNR had met the requirements of the Ka Pa‘akai test. 
The Hawai‘i State Supreme Court also dismissed the appellants’ 
arguments that the TMT project violates their federally protected right to 
the free exercise of their religion.215 Giving significant deference to the 
BLNR’s decision that TMT would not substantially burden Native 
Hawaiians’ religious rights, the Court rejected claims under the Free 
Exercise Clause.216 The Court also declined to apply RFRA because the 
United States Supreme Court held that RFRA’s statutory protections are 
inapplicable to state government actions.217 
B. Public Trust and Land Use Issue 
In addition to the numerous Native Hawaiian rights issues, the 
appellants also asserted various public trust and land use claims.218 The 
appellants first argued that the TMT project violated article XI, section 1 
of the Hawai‘i Constitution.219 The Hawai‘i Constitution’s public trust 
provision stipulates that the State “shall conserve and protect [Hawai‘i’s] 
natural beauty and all natural resources . . . and . . . promote the 
development and utilization of these resources in a manner consistent with 
their conservation.”220 This provision also mandates that “[a]ll public 
natural resources are held in trust . . . for the benefit of the people.”221 To 
comply with article XI, section 1, the government must balance between 
“conservation and protection of public natural resources, . . . and the 
development and utilization of these resources.”222 When balancing these 
interests, there is a “presumption in favor of public use, access and 
enjoyment.”223 
 
214. In re CDUA HA-3568, 431 P.3d at 770. The BLNR did impose “special conditions” to avoid 
impact on Native Hawaiian practices although seemingly very minimal and not addressing the core 
issue of development on an extremely sacred mountain. Id. These conditions included limiting 
daytime activities at TMT on up to four days per year, ceasing construction if historic remains are 
found, and allowing Native Hawaiians reasonable access to the TMT Observatory site to exercise 
any traditional and customary practices. Id. at n.18. 
215. Id. at 771. 
216. Id. 
217. Id. Notably, the Court’s discussion of the Free Exercise Clause was limited to just two short 
paragraphs and the opinion is absent of any Sherbert or Smith analysis. See id. 
218. Id. at 773–79. 
219. Id. at 773. 
220. HAW. CONST. art. XI, § 1. 
221. Id. 
222. In re CDUA HA-3568, 431 P.3d at 773. 
223. Id. at 774. 
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The Court concluded that TMT comports with article XI, section 1.224 
In doing so, the Court reasoned that the “BLNR’s finding that the TMT 
[p]roject will not cause substantial adverse impact to geologic sites is not 
challenged.”225 The Court further explained that the land will be restored 
pursuant to the “Decommissioning Plan” at the end of its “50 year useful 
life” or the end of the lease, whichever comes first.226 Although the Court 
was confident that measures implemented by the BLNR would help 
protect the land, this rationale fails to account for the previous fifty plus 
years of mismanagement of the existing telescopes. This mismanagement 
has polluted the area and deepened the distrust within the Native Hawaiian 
community of the government’s ability to effectively maintain and 
preserve Maunakea’s natural resources.227 The BLNR had similarly 
imposed conditions on UH’s lease, yet severe, irreversible damage 
resulted regardless of those conditions.228 
Native Hawaiians also asserted that use of TMT is a private use, while 
Native Hawaiians’ use of the land is public.229 However, the Court 
reiterated that there was no evidence that Native Hawaiians used the site 
area.230 The Court further explained the astronomical significance of the 
TMT project, noting that the people of Hawai‘i benefit greatly from the 
selection of Maunakea for its location.231 After explaining how TMT will 
provide grants, scholarships, and a workforce pipeline program for 
science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) students, the 
Court concluded that TMT’s use of the land is “consistent with 
conservation and in furtherance of the self-sufficiency of the State.”232 In 
doing so, the Court established a precedent that says projects indirectly 
providing substantial benefits to the State will justify substantial burdens 
on Native Hawaiian rights. 
IV. A SOLUTION TO ADEQUATELY PROTECT NATIVE 
HAWAIIAN RIGHTS 
Native Hawaiian rights and the genuinely held religious beliefs of 





227. See supra section I.B. 
228. See supra section I.B. 
229. See In re CDUA HA-3568, 431 P.3d at 775. 
230. See id. 
231. See id. 
232. Id. 
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development under existing federal and state law. Hawai‘i does not have 
a state RFRA, but even if there were such protections, the arduous 
substantial burden test has proved to be fatal to most Indigenous groups’ 
RFRA claims. Thus, to ensure protection of Native Hawaiian cultural and 
religious rights, the Hawai‘i State Legislature should both enact a state 
version of RFRA and codify a new definition of “substantial burden.” 
A. Enact a Hawai‘i State RFRA 
The Hawai‘i State Supreme Court’s decision exemplifies the difficulty 
of succeeding on Indigenous religious rights claims without the presence 
of a state RFRA.233 The United States Supreme Court held that RFRA is 
unconstitutional as applied to the states234 and to date, the Hawai‘i State 
Legislature has not enacted a version of RFRA. Without these statutory 
protections, Indigenous rights are not effectively protected. The primary 
alternative to a state RFRA claim would be for Native Hawaiian plaintiffs 
to bring an action under the Free Exercise Clause. While strict scrutiny 
has historically applied to Free Exercise Clause claims, Smith has severely 
eroded these constitutional protections by declining to apply strict 
scrutiny to valid and neutral laws of general applicability that substantially 
burden religious rights. Consequently, Smith’s holding generally controls 
for neutral, generally applicable state laws that burden the free exercise of 
religion and strict scrutiny is not applied.235 A state RFRA that mandates 
the application of strict scrutiny would provide the more protective legal 
claim that Congress originally intended for all people pre-Boerne. 
Even if the Hawai‘i State Supreme Court adopted a common law 
RFRA-like test, it is always subject to being overturned, or, as seen in 
Smith, severely confined to a very particular set of facts. Therefore, the 
most effective method to provide protection for religious rights is to call 
on the Hawai‘i State Legislature to enact its own version of RFRA. A 
RFRA bill that includes the following language is needed: “Neither the 
State nor its political subdivisions shall substantially burden a person’s 
exercise of religion unless it demonstrates that the imposition of the 
burden furthers a compelling governmental interest and is the least 
 
233. See supra section II.B. 
234. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) (holding that Congress exceeded its 
legislative powers because it enforced RFRA under the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, which “contradict[ed] vital principles necessary to maintain separation of powers and 
the federal balance”). 
235. See, e.g., State v. Sunderland, 168 P.3d 526, 530 (Haw. 2007) (concluding that despite the 
defendant’s arguments that “Congress enacted RFRA . . . to expressly supersede Smith’s elimination 
of the compelling interest analysis in the context of generally applicable governmental 
regulation, . . . Smith plainly controls”). 
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restrictive means of furthering that compelling interest.”236 
Passing a state version of RFRA is not without drawbacks. A major 
issue is the conflict between religious liberty and civil rights, specifically 
rights of the LGBTQ+ community. Article I, section 5 of the Hawai‘i 
State Constitution expressly prohibits discrimination against individuals 
on the basis of race, religion, sex, or ancestry.237 Furthermore, the Hawai‘i 
Employment Practices Act238 provides it is unlawful for employers to 
discriminate “[b]ecause of race, sex including gender identity or 
expression, sexual orientation, age, religion, color, ancestry, disability, 
marital status, arrest and court record, reproductive health decision, or 
domestic or sexual violence victim status.”239 
While it is beyond dispute that discrimination is an important concern, 
civil rights can be preserved with protective language. Therefore, the bill 
for a Hawai‘i state RFRA should also include the following language: 
This law shall provide a claim or defense whenever the free exercise of an 
individual’s religious beliefs or practices is substantially burdened by the 
government, unless the religious practice is in violation of the Hawai‘i 
State Constitution, the Hawai‘i Employment Practices Act, or being used 
as a defense to a civil action or criminal prosecution for refusal by a 
provider to offer or provide services to any member or members of the 
general public on the basis of sex, sexual orientation, or gender identity.240 
Including this language precludes potential discrimination against 
individuals under the guise of religious freedom.241 
 
236. While not the exact language used in the Hawai‘i State RFRA bill that failed to pass, this 
language is modeled after that bill. See H.B. 823, 29th Leg. (Haw. 2017) (“State action shall not 
burden any person’s right to exercise religion; provided that a burden shall be permissible if the 
burden results from a law or rule of general applicability and the burden to the person’s exercise of 
religion: (1) Is essential to further a compelling governmental interest; and (2) Is the least restrictive 
means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.”). 
237. HAW. CONST. art. 1, § 5. 
238. HAW. REV. STAT. § 378 (2020). 
239. Id. § 378-2(a)(1). 
240. This language is modeled after the anti-discrimination provisions in the Hawai‘i State 
Constitution, Hawai‘i Employment Practices Act, and the Indiana state RFRA. See HAW. CONST. 
art. 1, § 5; HAW. REV. STAT. § 378-2(a)(1); SEA 50, 119th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2015). 
241. There may be potential Establishment Clause issues with this proposed protective language. 
However, Indiana passed a highly controversial RFRA bill in 2015, which was deemed a license to 
discriminate by LGBTQ rights advocates. See Dwight Adams, RFRA: Why the ‘Religious Freedom 
Law’ Signed by Mike Pence Was So Controversial, INDYSTAR (May 3, 2018, 3:23 PM), 
https://www.indystar.com/story/news/2018/04/25/rfra-indiana-why-law-signed-mike-pence-so-
controversial/546411002 [http://perma.cc/XN75-HGPM]. As a result of substantial public scrutiny 
and boycotts from numerous states, companies, and organizations (including the NBA and NCAA), 
Indiana passed Senate Enrolled Act 50 in 2015—amending the State RFRA to provide similar civil 
rights protections to the proposed Hawai‘i RFRA. See id.; SEA 50, 119th Gen. Assemb. SEA 50 states 
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In addition to discrimination, other state governments have raised 
concerns about an explosion of litigation from passing a state RFRA.242 
However, contrary to speculation, claims under state RFRA laws have 
been surprisingly rare among the states that have enacted them.243 
Notably, one scholar asserted that although some states have seen 
significant amounts of state RFRA litigation, “many state RFRAs seem[] 
‘to exist almost entirely on the books.’”244 Of the sixteen states with 
RFRA laws, four states have not considered any claims under their RFRA, 
and six other states report only one or two cases.245 Thus, critics’ concerns 
of increased litigation appear unfounded, or at the very least, overstated. 
In the Maunakea litigation, the Hawai‘i Supreme Court dismissed the 
plaintiffs’ RFRA claim because the federal statute does not apply to the 
states.246 Passing a Hawai‘i state RFRA would give Native Hawaiian 
rights advocates a more cognizable legal claim where other claims have 
fallen short of providing adequate protection. 
B. Redefining “Substantial Burden” 
While a Hawai‘i state RFRA that imposes strict scrutiny is the first step 
towards protecting Native Hawaiian rights, it is insufficient standing 
alone. Before courts even conduct a strict scrutiny analysis, plaintiffs must 
demonstrate that the government action imposes a substantial burden on 
their religious practices.247 This burden is so onerous that not a single 
Indigenous plaintiff was able to produce sufficient evidence to meet this 
 
that the Indiana RFRA does not “authorize a provider to refuse to offer or provide services . . . on the 
basis of . . . sex, sexual orientation, [or] gender identity.” Id. Moreover, SEA 50 does not allow RFRA 
to be used as “a defense to a civil action or criminal prosecution for refusal by a provider to offer or 
provide services . . . to any member or members of the general public on the basis of . . . sex, sexual 
orientation, [or] gender identity.” Id. While these civil rights protections have withstood numerous 
legal challenges since 2015, litigation is still ongoing. See Crystal Hill, The Fight Against RFRA Isn’t 
Over. Meet Its Conservative Opponent, INDYSTAR (Mar. 26, 2020, 6:10 PM), 
https://www.indystar.com/story/news/politics/2020/03/26/rfra-indiana-why-conservative-lawyer-
suing-over-law/4860169002/ [https://perma.cc/W3P6-4D9V]. It is worth noting that this protective 
language remains current law in Indiana. An analysis of the Establishment Clause implications is 
however, beyond the scope of this Comment. 
242. See, e.g., Reinach, supra note 148, at 825 (explaining that senators in the Arizona State Senate 
argued a state RFRA would open the door to a drastic increase in litigation if the bill were adopted).  
243. See Christopher C. Lund, Religious Liberty After Gonzales: A Look at State RFRAs, 55 S.D. 
L. REV. 466, 467 (2010). 
244. Long, supra note 148, at 272 (quoting Lund, supra note 243, at 467).  
245. Id. 
246. See supra section III.A; see generally In re Conservation Dist. Use Application (CDUA) HA-
3568, 431 P.3d 752 (Haw. 2018). 
247. See Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058, 1068 (9th Cir. 2008). 
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requirement in the aforementioned federal case law.248 Scholars have 
argued that “[c]ourts grossly misunderstand, and improperly heighten, the 
threshold requirement of a substantial burden on religious exercise.”249 
The United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of a substantial 
burden creates problems because of its narrowly confined meaning that 
only applies to two specific situations: (1) “when individuals are forced to 
choose between following the tenets of their religion and receiving a 
governmental benefit”; or (2) “coerced to act contrary to their religious 
beliefs by the threat of civil or criminal sanctions.”250 Any lesser burden 
is not substantial and does not require strict scrutiny.251 Thus, the Court’s 
interpretation effectively “places beyond judicial scrutiny many burdens 
on religious exercise that RFRA was intended to prevent.”252 The Hawai‘i 
State Supreme Court indicated that it uses the same test as federal courts 
when addressing whether government action is a substantial burden on 
religious practices.253 Therefore, it is clear that the same restrictive 
standard would apply to Native Hawaiian religious rights claims. 
The solution to this arduous standard is for Congress and state 
legislatures to statutorily mandate the courts to adopt a new interpretation 
of what constitutes a substantial burden in order to provide the necessary 
protection for Native Hawaiian and Indigenous groups’ rights nationwide. 
Such a statute should codify a more literal, plain language definition of 
substantial burden, similar to the one articulated by Judge Fletcher’s 
dissenting opinion in Navajo Nation.254 Recall that the purpose of RFRA 
was “to restore the compelling interest test . . . and to guarantee its 
application in all cases where free exercise of religion is substantially 
burdened.”255 Black’s Law Dictionary defines burden as “[s]omething that 
hinders or oppresses.”256 Moreover, the American Heritage Dictionary 
defines substantial as “[c]onsiderable in importance, value, degree, 
 
248. See supra section II.C. 
249. Lund, supra note 243, at 468; see also Reinach, supra note 148, at 845 (“Government officials 
are beginning to understand that they can abridge religious liberty and argue that they have not 
imposed a substantial burden.”). 
250. Navajo Nation, 535 F.3d at 1069–70. 
251. See id. at 1070. 
252. Id. at 1091 (Fletcher, J., dissenting). 
253. See State v. Armitage, 319 P.3d 1044, 1070 (Haw. 2014) (citing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 
398 (1963) as its authority for the substantial burden inquiry) (“Having concluded that Petitioners 
practice of religion was not substantially burdened . . . the remainder of the Sherbert test need not be 
applied.” (emphasis added)). 
254. See Navajo Nation, 535 F.3d at 1091 (Fletcher, J., dissenting). 
255. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b). 
256. Burden, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).  
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amount, or extent.”257 To protect Native Hawaiian religious rights, the 
Hawai‘i state RFRA should define substantially burden as “considerably 
hinder or oppress.” 
Applying this new definition of substantial burden to the dispute over 
Maunakea would effectively protect the Native Hawaiian rights. Native 
Hawaiians believe Maunakea is a “sacred manifestation of their ancestry, 
[and] should be honored in its natural state.”258 The government’s 
approval of the TMT permit considerably hinders Native Hawaiians’ 
ability to engage in cultural practices on Maunakea. Not only are Native 
Hawaiians forced to go through numerous procedures to have access to 
their own stolen land, but the spirituality of their traditions and practices 
is severely curtailed by TMT’s presence on their sacred land. Moreover, 
the construction of previous observatories already had significant adverse 
impacts on cultural, archaeological, and historic resources.259 TMT’s 
construction would further alter and damage the natural state of 
Maunakea, imposing a substantial burden on Native Hawaiian 
religious traditions. 
Enacting a Hawai‘i State RFRA, in conjunction with a new, literal 
definition of substantial burden, would provide a legal avenue for Native 
Hawaiians to protect their cultural and religious rights. 
CONCLUSION 
In balancing Indigenous rights with competing development interests, 
the state and federal courts have generally allowed governmental 
intrusions on Indigenous groups’ religious and cultural rights. By 
allowing TMT to be built on Maunakea, the Hawai‘i State Supreme Court 
has further demonstrated the need for greater protection of Native 
Hawaiian rights. Without adequate legal remedies, the Native Hawaiian 
community has been forced to resort to mass protests out of desperation 
to protect the lands they consider sacred. 
To rectify these issues, the Hawai‘i State Legislature should enact a 
version of RFRA with a new definition of “substantial burden.” These 
protections are necessary not only to safeguard Native Hawaiian religious 
and cultural rights, but also to ensure that “religious conscience is 
respected and that the regulatory state does not unduly infringe on 
religious belief.”260 Although the Maunakea protests have halted TMT 
 
257. Substantial, AM. HERITAGE DICTIONARY, https://www.ahdictionary.com/word/search.html? 
q=substantial [https://perma.cc/5TRC-LQ26]. 
258. In re Conservation Dist. Use Application (CDUA) HA-3568, 431 P.3d 752, 757 (Haw. 2018). 
259. See id. at 758–59. 
260. Reinach, supra note 148, at 854. 
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construction, these additional measures are still necessary to protect the 
rights of Native Hawaiians. 
 
